Hemi's security model has two wheels: PoS validators (responsible for block production) and PoP miners (responsible for anchoring L1). For the past few days, I've been thinking about what would happen to Hemi if the PoP miner wheel suddenly broke—for example, if they collectively "went on strike" because L1 transaction fees were too high. My deduction is: the Hemi chain won't stop. Block production and transaction processing (the daily operation of L2) are the job of PoS validators. As long as PoS validators exist, the Hemi chain can continue to produce new blocks, and users can continue to transfer funds and participate in DeFi. However, the chain's "security attributes" will immediately undergo a qualitative change. It will degenerate from a "hybrid security" model of "PoS chain + Bitcoin finality" into a "pure PoS chain." It loses that "ultra-finality" anchor point that occurs every 90 minutes. This means that the state of the Hemi chain will no longer be protected by Bitcoin's PoW finality. Its security will rely 100% on the (economic) security of Hemi's own PoS validators. This will have a fatal cascading effect: Hemi's "tunnels" functionality must immediately cease operation. Because the security of "tunnels" (especially withdrawals) depends on the premise that Hemi's state is ultimately confirmed by L1. If Hemi loses L1 finality, then withdrawals from Hemi to L1 (e.g., hBTC -> BTC) become insecure. Therefore, a PoP miner "strike" won't cause Hemi to "crash," but it will cripple it. The Hemi chain will become an "island." On-chain activity (DEX trading, lending) can continue, but all connections to L1 (deposits, withdrawals) must be forcibly suspended by the protocol. This is unacceptable for a chain whose core selling point is "connecting to L1." Therefore, the Hemi protocol must design a robust enough economic incentive to ensure that PoP miners remain "on duty" at all costs. @Hemi $HEMI {spot}(HEMIUSDT) #Hemi